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Three missions have successfully used aerobraking to reduce the spacecraft orbit period 
and achieve the desired orbit geometry. A fourth, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, will 
employ aerobraking following its orbit insertion in March, 2006. The propellant mass 
reductions enabled by the aerobraking technique allow the use of smaller launch systems, 
which translate to significant savings in launch costs for flight projects. However, there is 
a significant increase in mission risk associated with the use of aerobraking. Flying a 
spacecraft through a planetary atmosphere hundreds of times during months of around-
the-clock operations places the spacecraft in harm’s way, and is extraordinarily 
demanding on the flight team.  There is a cost/risk trade that must be evaluated when a 
project is choosing between a mission baseline that includes aerobraking, or selecting a 
larger launch vehicle to enable purely propulsive orbit insertion.  This paper provides a 
brief history of past and future aerobraking missions, describes the aerobraking 
technique, summarizes the costs associated with aerobraking, and concludes with a 
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1.0 Introduction 
Aerobraking is a proven approach for shaping planetary orbits, using aerodynamic drag from the 
planetary atmosphere to slow the spacecraft and gradually lower the vehicle apoapsis.  The 
propellant savings that can be garnered using this technique are substantial; the Mars Global 
Surveyor (MGS) and Mars Odyssey missions both saved in excess of 300 kg of propellant via 
aerobraking.  The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) project will realize even greater savings 
as they aerobrake to their final science orbit next year. 
The propellant mass reductions enabled by the aerobraking technique allow the use of smaller 
launch systems, which translate to significant savings in launch costs for flight projects.  
However, launch cost savings are offset by the costs associated with the planning and execution 
of the aerobraking phase.  There is also a significant increase in mission risk associated with 
aerobraking. Flying a spacecraft through a planetary atmosphere hundreds of times during months 
of around-the-clock operations places the spacecraft in harm’s way, and is extraordinarily 
demanding on the flight team.  There is a cost/risk trade that must be evaluated when a project is 
choosing between a mission baseline that includes aerobraking, or selecting a larger launch 
vehicle to enable purely propulsive orbit insertion.  This paper suggests a methodology for 
evaluating this cost/risk trade. 
An overview of past and future aerobraking missions, including Magellan, MGS, Odyssey and MRO is 
provided in Section 2. A technical description of the aerobraking technique is given in Section 3.  Key 
aerobraking risk areas are discussed in Section 4, and a strawman probabilistic risk assessment for a 
generic aerobraking mission is given.  Aerobraking costs are discussed in Section 5, using Mars Odyssey 
as an example.  Section 6 describes an approach for evaluating the cost/risk trade associated with 
aerobraking versus the selection of a larger launch vehicle.  Conclusions are given in Section 7. 
2.0 Past and Future Use of Aerobraking 
Three missions have successfully used aerobraking to reduce the orbit period and achieve the 
desired orbit geometry. In 1993, after the Magellan primary science mission was completed, 
aerobraking was performed to nearly circularize the orbit to enhance subsequent scientific data. 
This mission proved that substantial modifications to the vehicle would not be required to 
perform aerobraking. Operational procedures were developed and validated by the Magellan 
flight team, and substantial experience was gained. Mars Global Surveyor in 1997 and Mars 
Odyssey in 2001 launched with propellant deficits, and relied upon the aerobraking technique to 
lower the orbit apoapsis to the desired altitude for the science mission. The propellant savings 
provided by aerobraking allowed these missions to launch on Delta II 7925 launch vehicles, 
providing a significant cost savings relative to the larger launch vehicles that would have been 
required if purely propulsive orbit insertion had been required.   The Mars Reconnaissance 
Orbiter is currently on the way to Mars and will begin aerobraking in March of 2006.  Table 1 
provides a summary of the key attributes of the pre- and post-aerobraking orbits for these 
missions, and their effective propellant savings via aerobraking. 
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Table 1.  Aerobraking Orbits and Propellant Savings 
Pre-Aerobraking Orbit Post Aerobraking Orbit  






Magellan 170 8450 3.2 200 540 1.6 1220 490 
MGS 120 54200 45 110 430 1.9 1220 330 
Odyssey 110 26200 18 120 540 2.0 1090 320 




The Magellan spacecraft was launched from the space shuttle in May of 1989.  An Inertial Upper 
Stage injected the spacecraft onto the interplanetary trajectory for arrival at Venus in August 
1990. The orbit insertion burn was performed by a Star 48B solid rocket motor. Magellan was 
placed into an elliptical orbit with an orbit period of 3.2 hours.  The relatively high eccentricity of 
this orbit compromised some of the science return during the prime mission.  For the first three 
Venus years, the synthetic aperture radar was used to obtain a global map of the surface.  
The desire to obtain higher resolution gravity maps in the polar region led to the 70-day 
aerobraking phase from late May to early August, 19931.  Magellan used atmospheric drag to 
remove over 1200 m/s from the orbit to achieve a lower eccentricity, 540 km by 200 km altitude 
orbit with a period of about 1.6 hours. The Magellan spacecraft is shown in Figure 1. During 
aerobraking, the large high gain antenna (HGA) was trailing the spacecraft bus, and the solar 
arrays were set normal to the aerodynamic flow. The large area of the HGA moved the center of 
pressure aft of the center of mass, providing substantial longitudinal stability while in the 
atmosphere. 
 
Figure 1.  Magellan spacecraft 
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Based on pre-aerobraking estimates of 50% orbit-to-orbit variability, the aerobraking dynamic 
pressure corridor was set between 0.27 and 0.32 N/m2. The upper boundary of the corridor was 
limited by the maximum temperatures for solar array solder joints and the potential for HGA 
delamination. The lower limit was set by the desire to finish aerobraking in less than 100 days 
and constrain the number of orbit trim maneuvers (OTM) needed to stay within the corridor. 
Early drag passes showed orbit-to-orbit density variations of less than 20% and lower than 
predicted solar array temperature increases due to aerodynamic heating, so the main phase 
corridor limits were increased to 0.29 and 0.35 N/m2.  The corridor and periapsis altitude during 
the mission2 are shown in Figure 2. Fourteen OTMs were required to perform the 70-day 
aerobraking mission.  
Magellan was intentionally entered into the atmosphere for the last time on Oct. 12, 1994.  The 
success of the Magellan aerobraking phase is a credit to the engineers that developed this new 
technique in order to maximize the science return from the mission and develop an enabling 
technology for the future. Many processes and lessons learned from the Magellan aerobraking 
phase have served as the building blocks for subsequent Mars aerobraking missions. 
 
Figure 2.  Magellan dynamic pressure and control corridor 
2.2 Mars Global Surveyor 
Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) was the first planetary spacecraft to rely on aerobraking as an 
enabling technology for mission success3.  The MGS aerobraking configuration is shown in 
Figure 3.  Drag flaps were incorporated at the end of each solar array, in order to increase the 
overall drag surface of the vehicle. In the aerobraking configuration, the solar arrays were to be 
swept 30 degrees to assure aerodynamic stability, and rotated so that the solar cells were on the 
downstream side of the array. 
During deployment of the solar array following launch on November 7, 1996, it was noted that 
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one array did not fully deploy and was tilted about 20 degrees from the fully deployed and 
latched position. After Mars Orbit Insertion in September, 1997, the aerobraking phase began. On 
the early aerobraking orbits, the deflection of the array was noted and was within the few degrees 
expected based on the best estimates of the failure mode at that time. On orbit 15, the density of 
the atmosphere was twice the prediction and the array deflected about 10 degrees, well beyond 
the expected value. Analysis of flight data and experiments performed on the flight spare led to 
the conclusion that the composite sheets on one side of the yoke, at the base of the array, had 
failed in compression and only the facesheets on one side (and perhaps some wires and aluminum 
honeycomb) were holding the solar array to the spacecraft. Based on this failure mode, it was 
determined that aerobraking could continue if the broken solar array was rotated with the cells 
into the flow. This configuration limited aerobraking to about one third of the originally planned 
dynamic pressure. The aerobraking phase successfully ended about one year later than planned. 
Yoke 
 
 Figure 3.  Mars Global Surveyor in aerobraking configuration 
The early phases of MGS aerobraking showed that the statistical orbit-to-orbit density variation 
was about 30% 1σ, consistent with expectations.  Changes of 100% or more occurred over small 
spatial scales during a single orbit. A regional dust storm occurred in Noachis Terra in November, 
1997, producing a density increase exceeding 100% from one orbit to the next. This increase 
occurred over all longitudes at 50 deg. N, the latitude of periapsis. The disturbance slowly 
decayed over about 75 days. MGS also encountered unpredicted planetary longitudinal waves 
with maximum-to-minimum density ratios greater than three. Recent papers suggest that these 
longitudinal waves propagate from the lower atmosphere, and are influenced by surface 
topography.  
2.3 Mars Odyssey 
The Odyssey aerobraking configuration is shown in Figure 4.  This configuration provided strong 
aerodynamic stability about the body z-axis, which nominally pointed toward the center of Mars 
during aerobraking. The solar array cells were oriented away from the flow to minimize cell 
heating. 
Page 5 of 17 Pages 
Deep Space Systems  GT-SSEC.C.6 
After orbit insertion on October 24, 2001, the orbital period was 18.6 hours. The goal of 
aerobraking was to reduce the orbit period to 2 hours by about January 15, 2002 to assure the 
proper local solar time in the final science orbit4. The reference orbit period decay profile, 
developed just after orbit insertion, is shown in Figure 5. Also shown is the actual orbital period 
reduction profile achieved during aerobraking. The 70% 2σ orbit-to-orbit variations in density 
anticipated from MGS were clearly present again. The actual orbital decay fell about 50 minutes 
behind the target at orbit 75. This was a result of the orbit periapsis precessing toward the North 
Pole and passing through the highly variable boundary of the polar vortex. While inside the 
vortex, the variability was substantially lower and aerobraking could be performed more 
aggressively, so that by orbit 245 the actual period was 13 minutes ahead of the plan. After 77 
days, aerobraking ended on January 11, 2002. This was 13 days shorter than the expected 90-day 
mission. The processes and methodologies developed by Magellan and MGS allowed Odyssey 
aerobraking to be performed nearly flawlessly. 
 
Figure 4.  Mars Odyssey aerobraking configuration 
2.4 Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter 
As shown in Figure 6, MRO will be the first spacecraft to have a significantly asymmetric 
aerobraking geometry relative to the flow field.   Drag from the HGA will produce a bias in the 
equilibrium angle of attack but will increase the pitch stability. To achieve the desired local solar 
time for the science orbit, the aerobraking phase must last about 6 months. As a result, MRO 
aerobraking heating rates will be considerable lower than Odyssey and more like the MGS phase 
two (post-redesign) aerobraking limits. Odyssey maximum heat rate safety margins were about 
100% in the main phase of aerobraking, while the MRO margins will be about 200%. MRO will 
make a major advance in the movement toward autonomous aerobraking by using onboard 
measurements to update the aerobraking sequence. The number of temperature sensors on the 
solar arrays has been increased beyond earlier missions and the locations were strategically 
placed so that the data will provide validation of aerodynamics and heat transfer methods. These 
data should provide improved confidence in safety margin calculations. 
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Figure 5.  Odyssey orbit period plan versus actual 
  
Figure 6.  MRO aerobraking configuration 
3.0 Aerobraking Operations Overview 
Aerobraking operations is a highly orchestrated process, requiring close interaction between the 
navigation team, spacecraft team, atmospheric scientists, and mission management.  Key 
decisions are made on a daily basis, to maintain the orbit periapsis within the desired aerobraking 
corridor, while being responsive to atmospheric density variations. 
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Two critical operations must be repeatedly accomplished in order to complete a successful 
aerobraking phase: drag passes are performed on every orbit, and orbit trim maneuvers are 
frequently performed at apoapsis, in order to maintain the desired periapsis altitude. 
A sample drag pass timeline is shown in Figure 7.  The spacecraft configuration process for a 
drag pass begins 30 minutes prior to the start of the drag pass, with the calculation of 
accelerometer biases.  Telecommunications is switched from the HGA to the low gain antenna 
(LGA), in carrier only mode.  The spacecraft slews to the aerobraking attitude 10 minutes prior to 
the drag pass.  During the drag pass, attitude and rate control deadbands are relaxed, allowing the 
spacecraft to trim to its aerodynamically stable attitude.  Following the drag pass, the spacecraft 
turns back to its normal attitude, with the HGA pointed at Earth.  Telecommunications is 
reconfigured back to the HGA, and telemetry playback from the drag pass is initiated. 
 
Figure 7.  Sample drag pass timeline 
Figure 8 shows a sample timeline for performing an orbit trim maneuver at apoapsis.  These 
maneuvers are used to control periapsis altitude to stay within the desired aerobraking heating 
corridor.  Stored maneuver parameters are often used as a “menu” for OTM selection.  The 
spacecraft heats the thruster catalyst beds, and begins the turn to the maneuver attitude 20 minutes 
prior to the burn.  Telecommunications is via the LGA during the maneuver.  Following the 
OTM, the spacecraft slews back to the desired orbit attitude, and plays back telemetry from the 
burn. 
During the aerobraking endgame, the orbit period is less than 2.5 hours, leaving little time 
between the orbit trim maneuvers and the drag sequences. 
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Figure 8.  Sample orbit trim maneuver timeline. 
4.0 Aerobraking Risk Areas 
Flying a spacecraft through a planetary atmosphere hundreds of times during months of human-
intensive operations is inherently risky.  As described in Section 3, aerobraking is a highly 
orchestrated process, requiring frequent maneuvers to maintain the orbit periapsis altitude or 
dynamic pressure within the desired aerobraking corridor.  By its nature, aerobraking requires 
around-the-clock operations and depends upon reliable communications between the Deep Space 
Network and the spacecraft.  The aerobraking thermal environments are difficult to test on Earth, 
forcing us to rely primarily on computational analysis for design validation.  Atmospheric 
variability, command errors, and vehicle safing can all pose critical threats to the mission.  This 
section describes the key risk areas involved in aerobraking, and concludes with a strawman 
probabilistic risk assessment for a generic aerobraking phase. 
4.1 Key Risk Areas 
4.1.1 Orbit-to-Orbit Density Variations 
The most prevalent risks encountered during aerobraking are related to environmental 
uncertainties.  Atmospheric density is highly variable at aerobraking altitudes, and our ability to 
predict orbit-to-orbit density variations is limited5.  MGS and Odyssey drew upon expertise from 
the Mars atmospheric science community for modeling and trend analysis, and folded their input 
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into the Mars Global Reference Atmosphere Model (Mars-GRAM 2000) for atmospheric density 
predictions.  During the course of Odyssey aerobraking, the standard deviation of the actual 
density at periapsis relative to the predicted density was about 30%, consistent with the MGS 
experience3.  Figure 9 shows the ratio of the measured to predicted maximum periapsis density 
during each orbit. Note that factors of 1.5 are not uncommon and two Odyssey drag passes 
encountered periapsis densities more than 100% greater than predicted.  Each point in Figure 9 
represents one drag pass; the x-axis is calendar date during the 2001-2002 aerobraking phase.  
The Odyssey aerobraking main phase design incorporated heating rate margins that could 
accommodate atmospheric densities up to 120% greater than those expected at the top of the 
aerobraking corridor.  In contrast, MRO has a longer period in which to aerobrake, so the design 
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Figure 9.  Mars Odyssey density variations from predictions 
4.1.2 Structural Loads & Thermal Cycling 
Aerobraking is a demanding physical environment for the spacecraft, with the potential to expose 
structural design flaws or latent mechanical anomalies.  An example of this was seen during MGS 
aerobraking.  Significant flexure of a solar panel was noted during the initial orbits of the MGS 
aerobraking main phase.  Aerobraking operations were suspended, pending an investigation of 
the anomaly and a redesign of the aerobraking phase.  It was determined that a solar array damper 
had likely been damaged during the post-launch deployment; the solar array could no longer 
sustain the drag forces planned in the original aerobraking design.  Following the redesign, MGS 
completed aerobraking with a reduced target dynamic pressure (roughly 30% of the original 
target dynamic pressure value).  The MGS aerobraking phase, originally planned for 90 days, 
ultimately took over 400 days to complete. 
Figure 10 shows the Odyssey modeled solar array temperatures during a main phase drag pass.  
Temperature sensors mounted within the solar array structure were used to correlate the thermal 
models with the actual sustained temperatures on the solar array.  Physical delamination of the 
Page 10 of 17 Pages 
Deep Space Systems  GT-SSEC.C.6 
solar array was thought to be the primary failure mode if corner temperatures of 190°C were 
surpassed. 
Figure 10.  Modeled temperature of Odyssey solar array during main phase drag pass 
4.1.3 Communications Failure 
Present-day aerobraking methods require near-continuous communications with the spacecraft, 
for return of drag pass data and uplink of command sequences. Aerobraking sequences typically 
include a set of “primary” drag passes (covering 1-5 orbits) which are intended for use, followed 
by a “backup” sequence of passes that are not intended for use unless the next sequence uplink is 
delayed.  Periapsis timing errors tend to accumulate, making the backup sequence less reliable 
than the primary sequence.  Near the end of its aerobraking phase, the Odyssey flight team 
uplinked a new sequence every 6 hours.  Change in velocity from each drag pass is evaluated, and 
subsequent apoapsis maneuvers are planned accordingly.  Loss of communications for an 
extended period (greater than 24 hours) during the final phase of aerobraking will result in the 
orbit periapsis decreasing rapidly, as atmospheric drag degrades the orbit.  To guard against this 
possibility, the Odyssey flight team included an autonomous “pop-up” maneuver at the end of 
each backup sequence of drag passes.  The pop-up maneuver would be executed only if the end 
of the backup sequence was reached before a new primary sequence was uplinked, and would 
effectively terminate aerobraking until communications with the ground could be reestablished. 
4.1.4 Spacecraft Safing 
A spacecraft safing event can occur at any time during aerobraking.  Safe mode is designed to re-
establish attitude knowledge on board the spacecraft, while orienting the spacecraft so that it is in 
a favorable attitude for communication with Earth while keeping the solar array on the Sun6.  
Depending on where the safe mode entry occurs during the aerobraking orbit, the spacecraft may 
enter the atmosphere in the safing attitude, rather than the planned aerobraking attitude.  
Aerodynamic stability is not assured while performing a drag pass in the safing attitude, and 
vehicle tumbling may occur.  Aerodynamic heating of sensitive spacecraft components and 
science instruments will put the hardware at risk. 
4.1.5 Human Error 
The labor-intensive aerobraking process requires command sequences to be built, tested, and 
uplinked to the spacecraft up to four times per day.  Human error in the sequence generation 
process is one of the greatest risks present during the aerobraking phase.  For example, a 
sequencing error that inadvertently commanded a periapsis-lowering maneuver rather than an 
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intended a periapsis-raising maneuver would likely be mission catastrophic.  The likelihood of a 
human error occurring is increased by fatigue and stress that accrue during around-the-clock 
aerobraking operations.  Efforts are underway to automate the aerobraking process7.  The first 
phase is to reduce the number of sequence uploads required.  Odyssey demonstrated a small 
portion of aerobraking autonomy during short orbit periods, through performing an on-board 
estimation of the most recent periapsis passage time, and computing an on-board update of 
subsequent periapsis times8.  MRO will further develop autonomous aerobraking by 
implementing this technique in the flight system.  However, aerobraking will remain a human-
driven process for sequence generation, atmospheric evaluation and maneuver decisions. 
4.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
This strawman probabilistic risk assessment is intended to provide an estimate of the quantitative 
level of risk that is involved in a generic aerobraking mission.  For this generic mission, it is 
assumed that a 90-day aerobraking phase is composed of 10 walk-in orbits where the periapsis 
altitude is gradually lowered to the designed aerobraking corridor, 300 main phase orbits where 
the periapsis altitude is targeted to stay within the desired heating corridor, and a walk-out phase 
consisting of 150 orbits where lower heating rates are targeted.  Each of the primary risk areas 
described above is evaluated, and the resulting aerobraking reliability is calculated. 
4.2.1 Orbit-to-Orbit Density Variations 
For the purpose of this calculation, an aerobraking corridor design similar to that used for 
Odyssey and originally planned for MGS is assumed.  With this design, an unexpected density 
increase of 120% (4-sigma) could exceed the vehicle heating limits.  This risk is relevant 
primarily during the main phase of aerobraking, where targeted heating rates are the highest.  The 
probability of a 4-sigma atmospheric density variation is 0.00006.  Considering 300 main phase 
orbits, the total probability of exceeding heating rate limits due to atmospheric density variations 
is 1-0.99994300, or 0.018. 
4.2.2 Structural Loads & Thermal Cycling 
If not caused by an extreme density variation, a structural failure during aerobraking would likely 
be due to a design flaw or a latent structural weakness.  The probability of a design flaw is 
estimated as 10-3, while the probability of a latent structural weakness (similar to MGS) is 
estimated as 10-2.  The combined probability of a structural load failure is calculated as 0.011. 
4.2.3 Communications Failure 
In order for a communications failure to be catastrophic, the autonomous pop-up maneuver 
placed at the end of the aerobraking backup sequence must fail.  If we assume that the probability 
of an extended communications outage during the 90-day aerobraking phase is 10-3, and the 
probability of a failed pop-up maneuver is also 10-3, then the combined probability of failure due 
to a telecommunications outage is 10-6. 
4.2.4 Spacecraft Safing 
If we assume that spacecraft safing events occur twice yearly on average, the likelihood of a 
safing event occuring during a 75-day aerobraking main phase is 0.34.  The probability of a 
mission failure due to an aerobraking drag pass while in safe mode is difficult to assess, but it is 
not likely to be less than 10-3.  Assuming this value, the resulting probability of a mission failure 
due to spacecraft safing during aerobraking is 3x10-4. 
Page 12 of 17 Pages 
Deep Space Systems  GT-SSEC.C.6 
4.2.5 Human Error 
The probability of a human error in the sequence development process is estimated to be 10-5 per 
sequence.  During the course of the aerobraking phase, roughly 250 sequences are sent to the 
spacecraft.  The likelihood that a given sequence error will be mission catastrophic is estimated as 
10-2.  The resulting probability of a catastrophic failure due to human error is 2x10-5. 
4.2.6 Combined Probability of Failure During Aerobraking 
If we statistically combine the probability of failure due to the modes described above, the 
resulting reliability of the aerobraking phase is assessed to be 0.97.  There is a 3 percent chance 
of catastrophic failure during the aerobraking phase for our generic mission.  Atmospheric density 
variation is the dominant risk area. 
It should be noted that the MRO mission is mitigating the risk associated with atmospheric 
density variations by designing to a much lower target heating rate during aerobraking main 
phase than was done on previous missions.  This approach dramatically reduces the risk 
associated with atmospheric density variations, but it results in a longer aerobraking phase 
(roughly 170 days) and requires many more sequence builds. 
4.2.7 Generic Orbiter Mission Risk 
In Section 6, we will evaluate the aerobraking cost/risk decision for a generic orbiter mission.  To 
provide context for the cost/risk analysis, a high-level probabilistic risk assessment for a generic 
orbiter mission is given here.  Table 2 shows strawman probabilities of successfully completing 
each mission phase.  These numbers are representative; actual mission probabilities will vary with 
the design and hardware components used. 
Table 2.  Generic Orbiter Mission Probabilistic Risk Assessment 




P(Orbit Insertion) 0.95 
P(Aerobraking) 0.97 
P(Science) 0.99 
P(Success | Aerobraking) 0.867 
P(Success | No Aerobraking) 0.894 
 
As seen in Table 2, for our generic orbiter mission the inclusion of aerobraking lowers the overall 
probability of mission success from 89.4% to 86.7%.  This 2.7% reduction in success probability 
is a price that the project pays when selecting the aerobraking approach; a method for assigning a 
financial cost to this risk is discussed in Section 6. 
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5.0 Aerobraking Costs 
Aerobraking represents an additional mission phase between orbit insertion and the onset of the 
science mission.  The costs associated with aerobraking can be subdivided into four major 
categories: aerobraking planning and development, aerobraking operations, science, and Deep 
Space Network (DSN) tracking.  Aerobraking planning and development represents the labor 
associated with preparing for aerobraking prior to launch and during cruise.  It includes the 
aerobraking corridor design, navigation development, atmosphere modeling, tool development, 
testing, and flight team training.  Aerobraking operations costs include the labor charges of the 
flight team, atmospheric advisory group, and mission management during the actual aerobraking 
phase.  The science team is a standing army that is fully assembled and charging to the project 
during the aerobraking phase.  Science team costs are book kept separately from the flight team 
costs.  Radiometric tracking and telemetry provided by the Deep Space Network also represents a 
major cost, as aerobraking typically requires continuous coverage by the DSN. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the Odyssey aerobraking costs.  The costs are estimated based 
upon the number of people involved and the duration of the work period.  Costs are given in 
FY’02 dollars. 
Table 3.  Mars Odyssey Aerobraking Cost Summary 
Category Cost (FY’02$) 
Aerobraking Planning and Development $1450K 
Navigation, Spacecraft Team, Mission Planning & Sequencing, 
Test & Training 
 
Aerobraking Operations $4810K 
Mission Management, Navigation, Spacecraft Team, Mission 
Planning & Sequencing, Atmospheric Advisory Group, DSN 
Scheduling, Ground Data System 
 
Science Team $3050K 
Science Operations and Data Analysis  
TOTAL ODYSSEY AEROBRAKING COST $9310K 
 
DSN tracking costs were not charged directly to the Odyssey project, so they are not accounted 
for in Table 3.  Based upon current DSN aperture rates (FY’06), the estimated cost for continuous 
34-m DSN station coverage for a 77-day aerobraking phase is $2.25M. 
6.0 Cost/Risk Decisions on the Application of Aerobraking 
The successfully completed aerobraking phases for the Mars Global Surveyor and Mars Odyssey 
missions have validated the propellant-saving aerobraking technique as a viable, low-risk 
approach for reducing launch costs.  With today’s launch systems, the cost savings can be 
significant, on the order of $10-$30M.  This level of potential savings on launch costs is quite 
attractive, particularly for highly cost-constrained competed missions.  In the 2007 Mars Scout 
competition, nearly every proposal that required orbit insertion baselined the aerobraking 
approach. 
Is this prudent?  The aerobraking approach unquestionably entails more risk than a purely 
propulsive orbit insertion.  Any mission that intends to use aerobraking to reduce the orbit period 
still needs to capture propulsively.  As we have discussed in Section 4, the aerobraking technique 
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exposes the spacecraft structure to a stressing environment, in which any design flaws or latent 
structural defects can manifest themselves in failure.  The vagaries of the planetary atmosphere 
introduce large uncertainties on structural heating during a drag pass, and the around-the-clock 
nature of aerobraking is stressing to the flight team, increasing the potential for commanding 
errors that could be mission catastrophic. 
If actual costs were the only consideration, the decision on whether to baseline the aerobraking 
approach would be straightforward.  Careful accounting of the costs associated with aerobraking, 
as shown in Section 5, would be compared with the launch costs associated with going to a larger 
launch vehicle to enable purely propulsive capture.  This comparison (with a large variance on 
the rigor with which the “careful accounting” step is accomplished) is typically what’s done when 
a pre-project decides whether to baseline aerobraking. 
However, this decision process completely ignores the added risk introduced by the aerobraking 
approach.  The key question is: how much is it worth to “buy down” the risk of aerobraking 
through buying a larger launch vehicle?  If aerobraking were 100 percent reliable, then the 
equation would reduce to a simple cost comparison.  If however, aerobraking introduced a 50 
percent chance of a mission catastrophic failure, then aerobraking would clearly be a non-starter, 
as the project risk posture would be unacceptably high.  Put another way, the high probability of 
failure would put the investment at an unreasonable risk. 
The strawman probabilistic risk assessment shown in Section 4 indicates that the probability of a 
successful aerobraking phase during a 3-month aerobraking period could be roughly 97 percent, 
which, when multiplied by the probability of successfully completing the other mission phases, 
lowers the overall probability of mission success from 89.4 percent to 86.7 percent.  Aerobraking 
risk can be mitigated through flying higher in the aerobraking corridor at lower heat rates, as will 
be done on Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter.  However, if we assume for the sake of argument that a 
generic project is taking on an additional 2.7 percent of mission risk through employing 
aerobraking, we can estimate the “effective cost” of aerobraking.  The “effective cost” is defined 
as the actual cost associated with aerobraking planning, support, and execution (as shown in 
Section 5) in addition to the probabilistic cost of failure during aerobraking. 
The Odyssey aerobraking operations and science costs from Table 2 can be reasonably scaled 
upward to our 90-day mission, and inflated to FY’06 dollars.  The resulting project cost for 
aerobraking is $12.4M.  Scaling the DSN costs for continuous coverage from 77 to 90-days 
results in a cost for DSN tracking of $2.6M.  The actual cost of aerobraking for our generic 
mission is $15M. 
The probabilistic cost of aerobraking failure is equal to the total cost of the project from inception 
through the aerobraking phase (i.e., the amount invested) multiplied by the incremental mission 
risk due to aerobraking (in our case, 2.7 percent). 
For a generic $450M mission, roughly $425M will be invested in the mission by the point of 
aerobraking completion.  The remaining $25M represents the cost of flight operations and data 
analysis during the science phase.  To determine the probabilistic cost of failure associated with 
aerobraking, the $425M investment is multiplied by the 0.027 reduction in mission success 
probability due to aerobraking, with a resultant probabilistic cost of $11.5M.  Thus, when 
evaluating an aerobraking mission with a smaller launch vehicle against a purely propulsive orbit 
insertion and a larger launch vehicle, we should calculate the “effective cost” of aerobraking as 
the planned cost of aerobraking ($15M) plus the probabilistic cost of failure ($11.5M).  The 
effective cost of aerobraking is therefore $26.5M. For this generic mission, the project manager 
should be willing to spend up to $26.5M to procure a larger launch vehicle to enable purely 
propulsive capture. 
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Without consideration of the probabilistic cost of failure due to aerobraking risk, the effective 
cost of aerobraking will be considerably underestimated, leading to poor cost/risk decisions in 
launch vehicle selection.  An understanding of this simple concept is necessary when performing 
mission trade studies early in the project life cycle, as well as in the proposal evaluation process. 
7.0 Conclusions 
Aerobraking is an enabling technology that allows significant propellant savings (typically, on 
the order of 300-600 kg for Mars missions).  These propellant savings allow reduced launch 
mass, which translate into savings in launch system costs.  However, the aerobraking process is 
quite complex, and not without risk.  A strawman probabilistic risk assessment indicates that the 
probability of failure for a 90-day aerobraking phase with Odyssey-like heating rates is about 
0.03.  This increase to the mission risk posture should be considered when making the 
aerobraking cost/risk decision at the inception of the mission.  For the generic $450M orbiter 
mission considered in this paper, the planned cost of aerobraking is estimated to be $15M, and 
the probabilistic cost of failure is $11.5M, for a combined “effective cost” of aerobraking of 
$26.5M.  If a larger launch vehicle can be procured to allow purely propulsive capture, and if the 
cost increment for the larger launch vehicle is less than the effective cost of aerobraking, the 
larger launch vehicle is a wise investment.  Applying this concept to early mission trade studies 
and proposal evaluations is a necessary step toward making appropriate cost/risk decisions. 
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